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Abstract 
 
Heavy vehicle-train collisions have the potential to be catastrophic in terms of fatalities, 
environmental disaster, delays in the rail network, and extensive damage to property. 
Heavy vehicles, such as ‘Road Trains’ and ‘B-Doubles’, are vulnerable road users due 
to their size and mass and require specific risk management solutions.  The present 
study aimed to capture the experiences of heavy vehicle drivers and train drivers at 
road-rail level crossings, with a view to exploring the contributing factors toward such 
accidents.  A series of semi-structured focus groups were conducted, with a total of 17 
train drivers and 26 heavy vehicle drivers taking part.  Though there were some 
differences between the groups in perceptions of the causes of heavy vehicle level 
crossing incidents, discussion in both groups centred on design issues and behavioural 
issues.  With regard to design, the configuration of level crossings was found to affect 
heavy vehicle driver visibility and effective vehicle clearance.  With regard to 
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behaviour, discussion centred around wilful violation of crossing protocols, often as a 
time-saving measure, as well as driver complacency due to high levels of familiarity.  
The implications of these factors for future level crossing safety initiatives are 
discussed. 
Keywords:  level crossings, train drivers, heavy vehicle, human error, qualitative. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A recent study by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) (Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau, 2003) indicates that from 1997 to 2002 there were 74 deaths due to 
collisions between trains and motor vehicles at railway level crossings.  Though these 
collisions represented less than 1% of the national road toll in the same period, they 
constitute a significant proportion of the Australian rail toll.  Fatalities are typically 
spread across the railway network, which boasts approximately 9400 level crossings.  
Of these crossings, only 30% are equipped with active protection systems (boom gates 
and/or twin flashing lights).  With such a large network, the potential for a catastrophic 
event at level crossings, such as a train derailment resulting from a heavy vehicle/train 
collision, is of great concern.   
 
Of all road crashes which occur, those that involve a collision between a heavy vehicle 
and a train are amongst the most severe.  Despite the low incidence rate of level 
crossing collisions, the potential loss in financial terms associated with a heavy vehicle-
train collision, and the associated potential for delay in the commercial rail network, is 
far from trivial.  Data collected from 1996 to 2000 in the state of Queensland indicates 
that, of the seventeen major incidents that occurred at level crossings, eight involved 
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semi-trailers and three involved other heavy vehicles (Ford and Matthews, 2002).  
Furthermore, a heavy vehicle/train level crossing incident also represented the highest 
cost resulting from a road accident in Queensland, a collision between a train and a 
‘road train’ in which the damage bill totalled $AUS3.25 million (Ford and Matthews, 
2002).  Two other such accidents have also eclipsed the $AUS1 million dollar mark in 
Queensland alone, with numerous others in the AUS$100 thousand to AUS$1 million 
range.  Similar incidents are also common across the rail network in other states.  For 
example, in the state of New South Wales alone, thirteen train derailments have resulted 
from heavy vehicle collisions at level crossings since 1992 (Cairney, 2003).   
 
Although there has been some shift of freight to rail in recent years, commercial heavy 
vehicle traffic on the eastern corridor of Australia is forecast to double in the next 5-10 
years.  Given the increased traffic, it would therefore seem logical to upgrade protection 
systems at all level crossings to reduce risk.  However, given the sheer size of the rail 
network in Australia, this has been judged to be neither a cost-effective nor practical 
solution (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2003).  As such, recent efforts to improve 
safety at level crossings are focusing on a human factors approach rather than purely on 
engineering solutions.  With level crossing collisions having such a destructive and 
costly potential, it is surprising that little research has been directed toward 
understanding the different perspectives of train and heavy vehicle drivers. 
 
Train drivers are in a position to provide a unique perspective on heavy vehicle-level 
crossing interactions.  Previous research conducted in Australia capturing train drivers 
experiences of driver behaviour at level crossings found that, on the basis of the number 
of unreported ‘near-crashes’ observed by train drivers, the risk involved at crossings are 
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more serious than the low accident rate suggests (Labour Council of New South Wales, 
2001). Furthermore, this research found that train drivers perceive there is a general 
disregard by motorists for the laws and warning systems at level crossings, with the 
overhanging of long heavy vehicles being a common issue. Though the impact of these 
incidents on train drivers receives little recognition, the research available suggests a 
variety of negative psychological side-effects, often severe enough to preclude a return 
to work (Labour Council of New South Wales, 2001).  Thus, given the opportunity they 
have to observe heavy vehicles at crossings, and the salience of the experience to the 
drivers themselves, train driver experience may be seen to be an important link in 
understanding heavy vehicles at level crossings.  
 
Although the perspectives of train drivers is an important element in understanding 
heavy vehicle-train collisions at level crossings, the input from heavy vehicle drivers is 
just as critical.  A conceptualisation of heavy vehicle drivers which occasionally arises 
in road safety circles is that of the ‘cowboy’ mentality; the perception that drivers 
consciously ignore the risks involved in their occupation, with indifference toward their 
own safety and that of the public.  The implication of such a perspective for level 
crossing safety is the inference that drivers deliberately ignore crossing protocols, 
adding to the risk of collision with a train.  While there is no doubt an element of risk 
taking exhibited by some heavy vehicle drivers at level crossings, such explanations are 
overly simplistic and fail to take into account external circumstances influencing driver 
behaviour (Arboleda, Morrow, Crum and Shelley, 2002).  Furthermore, they do not 
address the findings of technical research in the field, which has suggested that the 
design and configuration of level crossings is often inadequate for heavy vehicles (Gou 
and Bellvigna-Ladoux, 2003).  Gaining input from heavy vehicle drivers may serve to 
 6
put the contribution of conscious risk taking in perspective, allowing a clearer indication 
of its contributions to heavy vehicle driver difficulties at level crossings. 
 
This paper presents findings from an exploratory qualitative study focusing on the 
perspectives of train and heavy vehicle drivers to level crossing safety. The study was 
undertaken as part of a larger continuing national project investigating driver behaviour 
at level crossings and the role of educational countermeasures for different road user 
groups.  The output of this exploratory research can be conceptualised as the ‘ground-
work’ required to build specific, targeted road safety educational countermeasures for 
heavy vehicles, assisting in providing an alternative to engineering solutions for 
managing risk at level crossings. 
 
 
2. Method 
 
A series of focus group discussions were undertaken, consulting a sample of train 
drivers and heavy vehicle drivers who provided informed consent to participate in the 
research.  Each focus group ran for approximately 90 minutes, was moderated by 
trained researchers audio taped for later transcription.  Participants were informed that 
participation was purely voluntary and that their responses would remain anonymous 
through de-identification of any collected data.  In consideration of the sensitive nature 
of involvement in collisions (particularly fatal collisions), participants were not asked 
directly if they had been involved in a level crossing collision but were encouraged to 
discuss their experiences.  An agenda for the focus group discussions was developed in 
consultation with experts in the field, with topics including the nature, frequency and 
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reporting of incidents at level crossings; types of vehicles involved in incidents; types of 
behaviours observed at level crossings; perception of motivation for behaviours; the 
impact of incidents; and the effectiveness of protection systems.  Transcriptions were 
analysed through a qualitative thematic analysis process. 
 
2.1.  Train drivers  
 
The train driver focus groups took place during October 2004, with one focus group 
being held in a major city (metropolitan passenger services) and the other in a regional 
area (freight transport).  Seventeen train (17) drivers participated in total, with eight (8) 
from the metropolitan area and nine (9) from the regional area.  All participants were 
male reflecting gender profile of this workforce. The mean years of industry experience 
for the metropolitan group was 24 years (range 1 to 34 years) and for the regional 
group, 23 years (range 5 months to 42 years).  The majority of participants were train 
drivers (n=15), while two participants were train guards.  All participants had 
experienced ‘near-crashes’ with motorists at level crossings, while many regional train 
drivers had also experienced numerous ‘near-crashes’ with heavy vehicles.  The 
majority of participants also revealed that they had experienced a fatal level crossing 
collision during their career.  
 
2.2.  Heavy vehicle drivers 
 
Heavy vehicle drivers were recruited through convenience sampling at a large truck stop 
in Brisbane, with assistance from the Queensland Trucking Association (QTA), the 
principal Trucking/Road Freight industry association in Queensland.  In total, 26 heavy 
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vehicle drivers participated.  Agenda, time and moderation style mirrored the train 
driver groups.  All participants received incentives (a travel mug) for their time. Written 
information was provided to each potential participant, with verbal agreement being 
obtained for participation. Verbal consent was deemed the most appropriate type of 
consent for this industry, as anecdotal evidence suggests that many heavy vehicle 
drivers are apprehensive of road safety research. Most heavy vehicle drivers were 
employed drivers of ‘B-Doubles’, with a few being owner-operators.  It is noted that a 
“B-Double” is a large vehicle combination made up of a prime mover and two semi-
trailers, which is also often referred to as “road-train”.   
 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1.  Train driver perceptions of truck driver behaviour 
 
Throughout the focus groups discussions with train drivers, the risk raised by heavy 
vehicles at level crossings was a topic that emerged with regularity.  It became clear that 
train drivers consider their interactions with trucks and truck drivers a primary challenge 
in improving rail safety.  Drivers reported that the danger posed by heavy vehicles at 
level crossings was twofold:  risk factors associated with the physical size and mass of 
the vehicles, and risk associated with the behaviours of the drivers.  These factors will 
be discussed in detail below. 
 
3.1.1.  Risk associated with heavy vehicle size.  A theme common to regional and 
metropolitan train drivers was the risk of catastrophic consequence associated with level 
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crossing collisions.  The reasons given for this were the threat of derailment, serious 
property damage, the high risk of a fatality, personal injury and, most earnestly, the 
potential for enduring psychological consequences.  Drivers uniformly spoke about the 
continual fear they had of being involved in a collision with a heavy vehicle, and many 
spoke of the effects that such collisions had on train drivers involved.  For this reason, 
train drivers were said to consider any near-crash incident involving trucks particularly 
serious.  This is in marked contrast to the general view of near-crashes involving cars, 
which most drivers seem to rationalise and dismiss as a minor danger and acceptable 
part of their job. 
 
Another emergent theme relating to heavy vehicle size and mass was the fact that heavy 
vehicles have significantly more difficulty negotiating level crossings successfully.  
This concern was reflected by the regional and metropolitan drivers in different ways. 
While regional train drivers were more inclined to discuss the difficulties heavy vehicle 
drivers face in gauging the time required to cross the crossing safely, their metropolitan 
counterparts cited concerns related to unintentional overhang of long vehicles.  This 
overhang was said to be especially prevalent in high traffic areas, where a heavy vehicle 
driver underestimated the space required to clear a crossing, and were thus unable to 
obtain safe clearance.  Both the regional and metropolitan drivers reached consensus 
that these risks often existed not because of dangerous behaviour on the part of the 
heavy vehicle drivers, but inadvertently from a general ignorance as to the actual size of 
their vehicle.  Urban train drivers were further inclined to implicate traffic, road design 
and crossing location as factors increasing this risk. 
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3.1.2.  Risk associated with heavy vehicle driver behaviour.  The consensus of train 
drivers regarding risk caused by unsafe heavy vehicle driver behaviour, was that it 
occurred frequently and wilfully.  A common perception, especially among the regional 
train driver group, was that heavy vehicle drivers often deliberately increased their 
speed in order to ‘beat the train’ across the crossing.  Attributions for this behaviour 
centred on a perceived desire to avoid delay.  While some drivers took the view that this 
behaviour was generated by impatience or recklessness, others cited the intense time 
pressures that truck drivers are often placed under.  To this end, the drivers in the 
regional sample were able to cite that drivers employed by two specific trucking 
companies (names omitted) were chief offenders.  The wilful unsafe behaviour by the 
heavy vehicle drivers emerged as a more serious problem for the regional sample, with 
many examples of repeated violations at crossings suggesting it to be of primary 
concern.  However, train drivers within the metropolitan sample were also able to 
identify variations of this behaviour, such as the deliberate avoidance of boom gates. 
 
3.2.  Heavy vehicle drivers’ perceptions of their level crossing behaviour 
 
Drivers accepted some culpability, but perceived the motivations behind their behaviour 
at level crossings differently to train drivers.  Heavy vehicle drivers generally displayed 
a high level of knowledge regarding crossing laws and safety crossing behaviour.  
Furthermore, they also demonstrated an understanding of how difficult it was for train 
drivers to take emergency action to avoid a collision and did, on the whole, 
acknowledged that their fellow truck drivers do frequently infringe level crossing laws.  
Their assignment of causation for their unsafe behaviour, however, differed to that 
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perceived by the train drivers, and they were able to cite several factors influencing their 
actions at level crossings.  These are discussed below. 
 
3.2.1.  Crossing design.  A unanimous complaint from heavy vehicle drivers was that 
level crossings are not designed in a manner which is user-friendly to their vehicles.  
The metropolitan environment was cited as a primary example, where choice of 
crossing location, traffic and other roadway factors can lead to unintentional short-
stacking and overhang e.g., required to stop while part of vehicle remains on crossing.  
On the other hand, regional crossings were also said to cause difficulties, with design 
faults and location choice having detrimental effects on sight distances and train 
visibility.  A further comment was inadequate warning of approaching crossings, which 
drivers perceived greatly reduced their ability to take appropriate action.  Heavy vehicle 
drivers suggested that such shortcomings in design and protection systems were 
responsible for the majority of unsafe driver behaviour observed at level crossings. 
 
3.2.2.  Familiarity and complacency.  Heavy vehicle drivers nominated their high level 
of familiarity with their routes, and with the level crossings they encountered while 
travelling these routes, as a major factor associated with their crossing behaviour.  Here, 
it was discussed that drivers sometimes suffered lapses of concentration, resulting in 
them failing to follow appropriate safe crossing behaviour at level crossings.  Drivers 
tended to defend their own perceived complacency as a function of high levels of 
familiarity with the crossings and, furthermore, expressed a degree of confidence in 
their ability to identify which crossings were most dangerous and required most 
attention.  While a practical approach on the surface, this familiarity was sometimes 
observed to breed overconfidence in their abilities to control their vehicle, which 
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resulted in the drivers being generally less inclined to engage in safe crossing 
behaviours. 
 
3.2.3.  Wilful risk taking.  Though the truck drivers were generally inclined to identify 
the above two factors as the predominant causative agents of their unsafe crossing 
behaviour, a minority raised the spectre of wilful risk taking among drivers.  These 
reports included both confessions of individual involvement, as well as second-hand 
reports from and observations of other drivers’ behaviour.  The most prominent motive 
for unsafe behaviour was a desire to avoid delay in getting to their destination.  These 
drivers frequently cited the delay caused by not only waiting for trains to pass, but also 
the significant time lost involved in deceleration and re-acceleration.  Others were more 
direct, citing the personal frustration and impatience associated with stopping at 
crossings for professional drivers. These drivers stated that trains should be slowed 
down at crossings with large volumes of heavy vehicles.   
 
At the core of each of these behaviours were perceptions of time pressures due to the 
rigid timetabling imposed by the trucking companies.  Many drivers attempted to 
rationalise their behaviour by stating that, although they knew not obeying level 
crossing warning systems to be dangerous, they managed their risk level by limiting this 
behaviour to crossings where they perceived such behaviours to be ‘safe’.  It is worth 
noting that drivers were, in general, uncomfortable when discussing wilful risk taking, 
often attributing it to ‘other drivers’.  This points to a general awareness that this 
behaviour is not perceived as responsible, safe or socially acceptable. 
 
 
 13
4. Discussion 
 
The aim of this study was to provide a formative exploration of the behaviour of heavy 
vehicle drivers at level crossings.  It contributes to the existing literature by capturing 
the experiences of the primary parties involved.  This means that not only were the 
heavy vehicle drivers themselves consulted, but also the train drivers who, as it was 
revealed, often have first-hand observational experience of aberrant heavy vehicle 
driver behaviour at level crossings.  Taken together, the experiences of these two groups 
paint a more detailed picture of the circumstances and behaviours that may contribute to 
heavy vehicle accidents at level crossings.   
 
In addressing the contributing factors to heavy vehicle accidents at level crossings, both 
the train and heavy vehicle drivers gave consideration to the size of the trucks involved, 
and the difficulties that this posed in negotiating the crossings.  This was expressed both 
in terms of factors affecting clearance (impeded acceleration, length of carriage, 
manoeuvrability) and factors affecting visibility (lines of sight, angles of approach).  
There was a genuine consensus that such factors introduced a danger at level crossings 
over and above driver behaviour.  Research across the Canadian rail network, 
comparable to Australia’s in terms of its size and layout, supports such findings, having 
demonstrated that the design of level crossings often do not accommodate for the 
specific needs of heavy vehicles (Gou and Bellvigna-Ladoux, 2003).  It has been 
suggested that this is due to design considerations being based on an idealistically 
constructed testing environment, which assumes unrealistic clearance times for larger 
vehicles (Coghlan, 1997) and fails to adequately account for surrounding environmental 
factors (such as intersections and traffic patterns) (Caird, Creaser, Edwards and Dewar, 
 14
2002). Unfortunately, though such problems represent real dangers to level crossing 
safety, network-wide engineering-style solutions to these problems are currently 
regarded as economically and practically unfeasible (Australian Transport Council, 
2003).  Therefore, rightly or wrongly, this places the practical emphasis for level 
crossing safety onto the heavy vehicle driver. 
 
Beyond design factors, the responses of both groups demonstrate that heavy vehicle 
driver behaviour may add to the danger at level crossings.  To this end, two tendencies 
were cited:  the effects of familiarity on driver alertness to crossings, and a perception 
that heavy vehicle drivers take excessive risks. 
 
The effect of high levels of driver familiarity with routes was discussed among the 
heavy vehicle driver sample, with a degree of acceptance from the participants that it 
can lead to complacency at level crossings.  Given that the drivers in the sample 
reported a high level of knowledge of crossing protocols, as well as an understanding of 
the potential consequences of a collision, it may be surprising to see them nominate 
complacency as an explanation for dangerous behaviour at level crossings.  However, 
this may be more an artefact of their job than an admission of negligence.  Heavy 
vehicle drivers in Australia often drive a limited number of routes at a high frequency, 
meaning that they can become highly familiar with conditions and, by extension, the 
level crossings they encounter.  This constant exposure, coupled with the low frequency 
of level crossing accidents, may breed a learning effect that encourages complacency.  
For example, if a truck driver repeatedly encounters a certain crossing without seeing a 
train, this may lead to a low expectation of encountering trains here in this future and a 
learning that heightened attention is not required at this crossing (Witte and Donahue, 
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2000).  Given drivers constant exposure to the same level crossings, this learned 
complacency may hold a level of reinforcement difficult to break. 
 
Though learned complacency no doubt plays a role in dangerous heavy vehicle driver 
behaviour, both the train drivers and the heavy vehicle drivers cite deliberate risk taking 
as a primary cause.  Train drivers reported heavy vehicle drivers routinely exhibit 
dangerous behaviour they attribute to attempts to ‘beat the train’ and avoid stopping at 
crossings.  Heavy vehicle drivers confirmed this to be the case, though often attributed 
the behaviour to ‘other drivers’.  These behaviours can be categorised as violations on 
the part of the drivers, acts that imply a wilful disregard of safe crossing protocols, as 
well as indifference toward the risks involved in their behaviours (Lawton, Parker, 
Stradling and Manstead, 1997).  In the case of heavy vehicle drivers, however, this 
explanation tells only part of the story; more interesting are the influences that may 
facilitate the behaviour.  To this end, heavy vehicle drivers cited unrealistically rigid 
scheduling and punitive measures for non-compliance as a primary motivator for risk 
taking.  This is not an uncommon explanation, with previous work observing such 
heavy vehicle industry management practises as instrumental in driver violations 
(Arboleda et al, 2002).  Here the finding is given extra credence, however, by the train 
driver observations that wilful violations are more common among drivers of some 
companies than others.  This may suggest a move beyond the simplistic ‘cowboy’ 
characterisation of individual drivers, and a recognition that level crossing behaviour 
may be partly an issue of industry culture.  
 
Countermeasures 
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While the authors recognise that making wide spread changes to current operational 
level crossings may be considered unfeasible, future level crossing design (or scheduled 
maintenance and renovations) should accommodate for the specific size and layout 
needs of large trucking vehicles.  More specifically, the results of this research indicate 
that the level crossing design process should include consideration of the requirements 
and limitations of driving large vehicles, including: (a) length of vehicle, (b) 
manoeuvrability, and (c) visibility.  Furthermore, the implementation of advanced 
warning systems such as increasing the existence of early road signage may prove 
fruitful in improving safety.  In addition to design factors, after considering the study’s 
emerging themes regarding wilful violations and complacency, there may appear some 
merit in implementing educational awareness campaigns that highlight to large vehicle 
drivers the increased risks associated with operating trucks on and around level 
crossing.  Such an initiative could be conducted at a company-level through the 
supervision or induction process and possibly reinforced through corresponding 
regulatory governing bodies.  From an enforcement perspective, the likelihood of 
creating attitudinal and behavioural change would also be increased if risky level 
crossing manoeuvres were detected and penalised, or alternatively, if perceptions of 
such detection was increased.   Taken together, an appropriate amount of attention 
should be directed towards improving level crossing safety at both the environmental 
and driver level, as the complex conditions encountered at such locations remains one of 
the most difficult driving tasks associated with operating large vehicles.   
 
5. Conclusion 
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Though the number of incidents involving heavy vehicles at level crossings may pale in 
comparison to other road accidents, it is the sheer scope for catastrophe in terms of 
dollar value and loss of human life that marks it as an area worthy of study.  In 
capturing the experiences of both train drivers and heavy vehicle drivers, the two groups 
most likely to have first-hand experience with the behaviours, incidents and 
consequences involved, this study has aimed to articulate the understanding of heavy 
vehicle level crossing safety.  The results show that, while crossing design is regarded 
as a legitimate contributing risk factor, the behaviour of heavy vehicle drivers at level 
crossings still poses a considerable danger.  With increasing rail and road freight traffic 
across Australia, coupled with the prohibitive cost of design-based safety solutions, the 
need for interventions targeted at changing heavy vehicle drivers’ behaviours and 
attitudes to level crossing safety becomes clear.   
 
The specific development of level crossing countermeasures and protocols aimed at 
improving safety would also benefit from further research into this sub-culture of truck 
drivers who have traditionally been reluctant to participate in programs of research.  
However, the findings of this study need to be replicated with larger sample sizes to 
determine the generalisability of the main themes, as well as identify additional 
contemporary factors that influence level crossing behaviours among both train and 
truck drivers.  Additionally, it may prove of assistance to examine other areas of health 
promotion research that have been successful in targeting specific behaviours among 
certain subgroups rather than relying on generalist education campaigns.  While likely 
to remain difficult, research endeavours to improve level crossing behaviour among 
such groups can only assist in the identification of effective and practical methods to 
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reduce the risk and consequences of serious crashes at meeting locations of rail and road 
transport services.   
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